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Abstract
There is more resistance to layo¤s in continental Europe than in the U.S. At the same
time, there is some evidence that employed European workers are more productive than their
American counterparts. We reconcile these two facts by proposing that some institutions,
such as Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), induce workers to invest in and develop
job specic skills, making them more productive and leading to costly displacement as these
types of skills are lost upon separation from the employer. It is also well established that
mobility patterns - ows in and out of unemployment or even movements from job to job,
are reduced in continental Europe relative to the U.S. The possibility to invest in skill im-
provement introduces a complementarity between EPL and the investment decision: more
stable matches increase the incentive to accumulate specic skills; but also more productive
matches are broken less frequently; hence there is a multipliere¤ect arising from this com-
plementarity. To quantitatively assess all these propositions, we built a tractable asymmetric
information matching model featuring all types of transitions out of employment: layo¤s,
quits to unemployment and job-to-job transitions. We nd that EPL does induce workers to
invest more in human capital and may help explain greater resistance to layo¤s in Europe.
We nd that ows out of employment are indeed reduced by EPL. However, allowing for skill
investment does not generate any strong multiplier due to the fact several new e¤ects are at
play keeping unemployment duration at a low level and thus putting downward pressure on
the multiplier. The conclusion of all this may be that EPL matters for explaining specializa-
tion and low movements out of jobs, but that low movements out of unemployment may be
better explained by other institutions such as unemployment benets.
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1 Introduction
In Continental Europe, workersdisplacement from traditional industries is the cause of social and
political tensions. For instance, in Flanders, the most dynamic region of Belgium, the announce-
ment of the Renault-Vilvorde plant closing in 1997 and the associated layo¤ of 3100 workers set
huge demonstrations o¤ and was one of the rst Euro-strikes. In contrast, the U.K. or the U.S.
have traditionally been more phlegmatic about massive job losses. The most recent example is
the announcement of the closure of a Rytons car plant with layo¤s of 2300 workers by Peugeot in
the U.K. in April 2006, not prompting any reaction from the British government.
The contrast between the two reactions is striking, even though in both cases the local unem-
ployment rate was relatively low. An objective of this paper is to understand why there exists such
a di¤erence in the perception of mobility and displacement costs. The answer we propose is that
continental European workers have been induced by labor market institutions such as employment
protection legislation (EPL) to invest in and develop job and sector specic skills, leading to costly
displacement as these types of skills are lost upon separation from the employer. In essence, the
rent associated with holding a job increases with EPL. In contrast, institutions in the U.S. or the
U.K. are much less specicity-friendly and thus lead to lower costs of occupational mobility.
It is also well established that mobility patterns - ows in and out of unemployment or even
movements from job to job, are very di¤erent between continental Europe and the U.S./U.K.
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Movements across regions is also limited in Europe. According
to the OECD Employment Outlook and Layard and Nickell (1999), mobility rates in terms of the
fraction of the population moving from one region to another is between twice and ve times lower
in France, Germany and Italy (between 0.6% and 1%) than in the U.S. (around 3%). As a result,
rates of unemployment in Continental Europe are larger and more persistent in countries such
as Spain, France, Italy or Belgium than in the U.S. The literature has focused on institutional
di¤erences to explain the patterns observed in Europe and the U.S. In particular, EPL has been
argued to restrict the mobility of workers as numerous authors (Bertola and Bentolila, 1990;
Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; Delacroix, 2003; Millard and Mortensen, 1997; Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999) have accounted for what is sometimes referred as Eurosclerosisby pointing out
to more stringent ring restrictions. All such explanations are based on the fact that EPL renders
layo¤s more costly, thus reducing ows into unemployment. However, if rms anticipate that
their expected lifetime surplus will be negatively a¤ected by EPL, they will less actively look for
workers, who hence will stay unemployed longer on average. Flows back into unemployment will
thus be reduced as well. The two mechanisms have opposite e¤ects on the unemployment rate.
Blanchard and Portugal have developed such an argument to show how calibrated Portuguese
and American economies can exhibit similar unemployment rates, but very di¤erent ows - much
smaller in the case of Portugal. These authors have even shown that both quits and layo¤s are
reduced by EPL. As in the above literature, the reason is similar: EPL reduce market tightness
and thus makes it relatively more costly not only to be laid o¤, but also to quit.
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Since this approach has been successful in explaining reduced mobility, we proceed in that
tradition. However, our contribution is to consider that more stable matches may also lead to
a greater incentive to build up specic human capital, an issue that none of these authors are
considering. Indeed, Layard and Nickell (1999) nd that productivity per hours worked is higher
in continental Europe than in the U.K./U.S. A vast empirical literature (Farber 1993, 1998, 2005;
Jacobson et al., 1993; Ruhm, 2005 for the U.S.; Arranz et al., 2005; Bender et al., 2002; Lamo
et al., 2005; Lefranc, 2003 for Europe) also quanties earnings losses following displacement. We
show that such costs, predominantly featured by specic skills, are a key ingredient in the analysis
of unemployment and job reallocations. We will notably emphasize a complementarity between
EPL and specic capital. The presence of costly ring regulations increases job tenure and thus
raises the expected duration over which any (match specic) investment can be recouped. Thus,
EPL create an additional incentive to invest to improve current productivity. In fact, considering
specic human capital (SHC) when modeling EPL is important since there is complementarity
between two mechanisms which reinforce each other: because of EPL, more stable matches will
increase the incentive to accumulate SHC; but also more productive matches will be broken less
frequently. hence there is a multipliere¤ect arising from this complementarity.
We thus introduce a mechanism through which ring restrictions a¤ect employed workers
productivity. It is interesting to contrast it to the reallocation e¤ect of EPL obtained in the
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) framework. There, ring costs hinder the reallocation of workers
across production units subject to idiosyncratic shocks. These allocative ine¢ ciencies have a
negative e¤ect of average productivity.1 However, this is obtained in a setup without human
capital and where productivity is determined solely by idiosyncratic shocks. We instead emphasize
that EPL may magnify the incentive to invest in productivity improvements.
This mechanism is also important in understanding the reluctance to layo¤s observed in conti-
nental Europe. If European workers are indeed more productive than their American counterparts,
a traditional matching model with exogenous skills would predict that they should also be less
opposed to layo¤s, as their unemployment spells would be shorter (Delacroix, 2003; Millard and
Mortensen, 1997). This, however, is assuming that individual productivity is independent of in-
stitutions. In a model where there is a complementarity between the two, a loss of a job implies
a costly loss of specic human capital.
The channel was introduced in a layo¤ model in Wasmer (2006), but we need to generalize
it in a calibrated model of both quits and layo¤s: indeed, EPL and SHC are dual components of
separation costs. EPL is an obstacle for rm-induced separations while SHC is an obstacle for
workers induced separations. Our rst task is thus to build such a quit-layo¤model as two distinct
transitions. We also model job-to-job transitions as these movements are also made costlier by
the loss of human capital. Thus the paper has a theoretical contribution as well since it builds
a tractable matching model with layo¤s, quits into unemployment and job-to-job transitions that
1Although average productivity may increase when small rms are exempted as in Europe, even in the Hopenhayn
and Rogerson framework (Alessandria and Delacroix (2006)).
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can be addressed to answer a number of questions. It is important as recent literature (Nagypál,
2006 among others) has shown the quantitative importance of job-to-job transitions, for example.
Another theoretical contribution is that the model features ine¢ cient destructions, a feature absent
in the traditional Mortensen and Pissarides framework.
Numerically, we nd that EPL does increase the incentive to specialize and invest in specic
human capital in magnitudes similar to the productivity di¤erences between the U.S. and conti-
nental European countries as found in Layard and Nickell (1999) who contrast GDP per hours
across countries.2 We also nd that EPL causes relatively larger losses from displacement as the
gap between the values of employment and unemployment is increased since human capital in-
vestment makes employed workers more productive and reduces the value of unemployment due
to the cost of having to re-invest in the next job. Thus more stringent EPL implies greater rents
from holding a job and more resistance to layo¤s.
We do nd that all ows out of jobs - quits, layo¤s and job-to-job movements, are restricted by
ring regulations. This in turn raises the return from SHC investment. However, when we quantify
the associated multiplier e¤ect, we nd it to be relatively weak. This is because our setup brings
three new channels through which general equilibrium e¤ects of EPL are felt. First, EPL reduces
ine¢ cient surplus destruction. Second, EPL induces workers to invest more in specic capital
and thus rms to post more vacancies. Third, the perspective of having to re-invest in the next
job reduces the workers bargaining position vis-à-vis the rm. All three e¤ects tend to reduce
unemployment duration and to restrict the quantitative multiplier. We consider a few avenues
that would reverse these e¤ects and increase the multiplier. One of them would be to re-evaluate
the combined e¤ects of EPL and unemployment insurance benets on unemployment duration,
by considering that these policies do not only a¤ect the frequency of matching opportunities, but
also the rate at which o¤ers are accepted. This can be done easily within this framework.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide the basic intuition of a static quit-layo¤
model. In Section 3, we develop it in a dynamic setup with EPL. In Section 4, we enrich the model
by adding a human capital decision upon entry into the match. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 discusses
further a few features of labor markets and then calibrates the model to U.S. and European
economies. Section 5.3 simulates the two economies under di¤erent scenarios. In Section 6, we
conclude and suggest alleys for future research.
2Other possibilities have been suggested to help explain why European workers are more productive, which are
also based on institutions. One is that some institutions may leave the least skilled workers out of the labor force,
thus raising the average productivity of the remaining workers actively engaged in the labor market. Another is
that certain institutions may improve the quality of matches (Delacroix, 2002; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999). We do
not take the position that these channels are irrelevant. Instead, we suggest that EPL may also increases employed
workersincentive to invest in productive improvements.
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2 A static quit-layo¤model
We start by introducing the bargaining game in a static setup.3 We can thus illustrate in a simple
manner the trade-o¤s faced by the two parties when making o¤ers. The game is extended to a
dynamic setup in section 3, where we also introduce on-the-job search and ring costs.
Suppose a match is formed between a worker and a rm, generating output h + " where h is
known to both agents and " is a private value " known only by the rm. The worker also has a
private valuation  from the match. Each party has an exogenous outside option U for the worker
and V for the rm. Let w be the wage paid by the rm. Hence, the payo¤s from agreement are
(w + ; h + "   w) to the worker and the rm respectively. The inability to reach an agreement
implies a separation and the set of payo¤s (U ;V).
Assumption 1. (Asymmetric information) The private value " is drawn from a cdf F with support
["min; "max]. The private value  is drawn from a cdf G, with support [min; max]. We make no
restriction on "max and max which can be innite, but exclude distributions for which the support
has no lower bound.
Assumption 2 (Take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers). One party makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other
party. Denote by wf (ww) an o¤er made by a rm (worker).
Assumption 2 implies that the party making the o¤er faces a trade-o¤ between obtaining
a more favorable wage when the o¤er is accepted and being turned down by the other party,
which leaves the o¤ering party with its outside option. Since the payo¤ from agreement is strictly
monotonic in the o¤ered wage, we have reservation strategies on both sides. Let us dene a
reservation productivity level "r = "r(ww) for the rm idiosyncratic component and a reservation
utility level r = r(wf ) for the workers idiosyncratic component by h + "r(ww)   ww = V and
wf + r(wf ) = U , or (
"r(ww) = V   h+ ww;
r(wf ) = U   wf :
Also denote by f (w) the surplus to the rm (worker), and by  the total surplus,8><>:
w(w) = w +    U =    r(w);
f (w) = h+ "  w   V = "  "r(w);
 = h+ "+    (U + V):
A wage o¤er is accepted if and only if it makes the party receiving it better o¤ than with its
outside option. For reasons discussed below in the dynamic context, a rejection by the worker of
3This type of negotiating game is suggested in Shimer (2005), although to address other kinds of questions.
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an o¤er made by the rm is denoted as a quit and a rejection by the rm of an o¤er made by the
worker is denoted as a layo¤ :The wage o¤er is accepted if and only if it makes the party receiving
the o¤er better o¤ than with its outside option.
2.1 Firms o¤ers
We rst solve here for the rms o¤er. The nature of the trade-o¤ mentioned above implies that
the o¤er must maximize the rms expected surplus.4 Recognizing that there is no need to (i)
o¤er a wage below one which would be refused for sure by all possible types of workers, or (ii) to
o¤er a wage above one which would be accepted for sure by all types of workers, the rm o¤er
wf (") solves
max
w
(1 G(r(w)):f (w);
s.t. min  r(w)  max:
The solution to this problem can be an interior or one of two corner solutions. The rst one
corresponds to the case where r(wf ) = min, i.e. when the rm wants to retain the worker for
sure. The second corner corresponds to the case where r(wf ) = max, i.e. when the rm makes
an o¤er that is acceptable to no worker. To rule out that possibility, we need to verify that " is
such that r(wf ) < max.
Denote by Q(wf ) the probability of a quit following an o¤er wf . Solving the rms problem
leads to (
Interior solution, Q(wf ) = G(r(wf )) and HG(r(wf )):f (wf ) = 1;
Corner solution, Q(wf ) = 0 and r(wf ) = min;
(1)
where HG() = g()=(1   G()) is the hazard rate function associated with the distribution G.
The expressions in (1) reect the tensions faced by the rm. By increasing the wage o¤er, the rm
decreases its surplus, but also reduces r(wf ), thus the chance of a separation. The trade-o¤ is
quantied by the hazard rate: it states that at the optimal wf , the marginal rejection probability
g(r(wf )) times the total surplus f has to equal the marginal gain in surplus (unity) times the
continuation rate 1   G(r(wf )). Of course when " is high enough, the rm makes an o¤er that
just ensures continuation and the wage becomes independent of ".
Assumption 3. HG() is non-decreasing over its support.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 3, the interior solution is unique and wf is increasing in ".
Proof. See Appendix.
4The rm o¤er maximizes Pr(e < r(w)) V+(1 Pr(e < r(w))) (h+" w), which is equivalent to maximizing
expected surplus.
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Assumption 3 is only a su¢ cient condition, satised for a wide range of distributions. The rst
part of the proposition means that system (1) determines a well-dened interior solution. The
second part conrms the intuition that the higher the rm idiosyncratic productivity, the more
costly it is for the rm to incur a breakdown and thus wf is increasing in ".
Given the uniqueness of the interior solution, we have a simple partition of the support of
the distribution F into two regions, separated by a unique b" dened by the value of " for which
the interior solution and the rst corner solution coincide. At this point, r(wf ) = min and
wf = U   min so that using system (1), we have b" such that5
b" = U + V+H 1G (min)  h  min.
The separation rule can also be derived simply. When "  b", there is no separation. When " < b",
the worker refuses the o¤er if  < r(wf (")). Considering only cases in which b"  "min,6 we have
that conditional on a rm o¤er, the ex-ante probability of a quit is
Q =
Z b"
"min
G(r(wf (")))dF ("):
2.2 Workers o¤ers
The trade-o¤ faced by the worker in making an o¤er is similar to the rms one. We thus proceed
similarly to obtain a simple partition of the support of the distribution G into two regions, sepa-
rated by a unique b dened by the value of  for which the interior solution and the rst corner
solution precisely coincide. This threshold is given by7
b = U + V +H 1F ("min)  h  "min.
A worker characterized by   b makes an o¤er retaining the rm in the match for sure, while
a worker with  < b will make an o¤er with a risk of separation. Denoting by L the ex-ante
probability of a layo¤ conditional on a worker o¤er, we obtain that
L =
Z b
min
F ("r(ww()))dG():
2.3 The case of exponential distributions
A simple solution can be obtained when HF and HG are constant, as is the case for exponential
distributions. In that case, F (") = 1   e (" "min) over ["min;+1) and G() = 1   e ( min)
5We can also compute wage o¤ers. For " < b", wf = h+ "  V  H 1G (r(wf )). For "  b", wf = U   min.
6Note also that there is a degenerate case, ruled out throughout the text, in which b" < "min so that there is no
longer any quit. This case is reached when the value of h is large enough compared to outside options of agents.
We choose parameters so as to always exclude this case but discuss it in appendix.
7We can also compute wage o¤ers. For  < b, ww = U    +H 1F ("r(ww)). For   b, ww = "min + h  V.
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over [min;+1) and we know that HF (") =  and HG() = . We choose lower bounds which
are not zero, but rather "min and min so that we dot not necessarily have equality of the mean
and the standard deviation (E(") = "min + 
 1 and F =  1).
With constant hazard rates, the system can be solved analytically and the reservation levels
are such that "r(ww()) +  = b + "min and "+ r(wf (")) = b"+ min, leading to the solution8>>>><>>>>:
b" = U + V+ 1   h  min;b = U + V+ 1   h  "min;
L =
R b
min
F (b    + "min)dG();
Q =
R b"
"min
G(b"  "+ min)dF (");
while wage proles are described by(
wf = min(h+ "  V    1;U   min);
ww = max(   V +  1; h+ "min   V):
The surpluses also take simple forms reported in Appendix.
Figure 1 graphically summarizes the above results. The gure represents the outcome of the
negotiating game following a rm o¤er (the case of worker o¤er is similar).
Insert gure 1 here [quit and continuation regions in ("; )-space].
The graph illustrates a very important characteristic of the bargaining game. The probability
of a separation following an o¤er by the rm is fully determined by the productivity thresholdb" (or b for an o¤er by the worker). This property will greatly simplify equilibrium when we
consider the dynamic case. However, notice that its interpretation is di¤erent from the reservation
productivity in a traditional full information Mortensen and Pissarides (MP) framework. In MP,
the reservation productivity is also su¢ cient to compute the ex-ante probability of a separation,
since it denes the level below which all matches break down. In this setup too, all matches with
"  b" do survive as rms want to make sure that the match remains in place by o¤ering a surplus
to the worker w =    min . Yet some matches characterized by " < b" may survive as long as
 is high enough (as long as " +  > b" + min). With an abuse of language, we refer to b" as the
quit-point (i.e. the point above which there can be no quit) and to b as the layo¤-point (i.e. the
point above which there can be no layo¤). Note that quits increase with b" while layo¤s increase
with b. Since both cuto¤ points decrease with h  (U + V), this means that turnover is generally
lower when the current match is more productive vis-à-vis the outside options.
Some intuition can be gained from rewriting the denitions of b" as h+b"+ min = U + V+ 1
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and of b as h+ "min + b = U + V+ 1 or(
Firm o¤er: Joint value of agreement at (b"; min) = Joint value of disagreement +  1,
Worker o¤er: Joint value of agreement at ("min; b) = Joint value of disagreement +  1.
(2)
Not surprisingly, asymmetric information leads to the possibility of ine¢ cient separations. Con-
sider an o¤er by the rm for example. A separation is ine¢ cient if the total surplus  =
h + " +    (U + V) is positive, while the worker surplus w =    r(w) is negative (the rm
does not make an o¤er it would itself refuse). Given the expression for r(w) = b" + min   ", an
ine¢ cient separation takes place when
U + V   h  "+  < U + V   h+  1:
A similar calculation can be made for worker o¤ers. Thus we refer to system (2) as ine¢ cient
destruction conditions.
3 Dynamic framework with xed human capital
We retain assumptions 1  3 and the information structure of the game, but extend the game to a
dynamic setting, endogenizing the outside options U and V. We also enrich the model along three
dimensions. First, we introduce EPL in the form of taxes to the rm due upon separation. Second
we add a cost of separation to the worker, which we take as exogenous for now and interpret as the
necessity to reinvest in human capital for the worker. The human capital decision is endogenized
in the next section. Third, we add on-the-job search as job-to-job movements in addition to quits
and layo¤s are a¤ected by both EPL and already incurred SHC investments.
Employment protection legislation:
The failure to reach an agreement between workers and rms involve explicit separation costs
paid by rms, which are assumed to be pure taxes, rather than transfers. Whenever the rm
rejects an o¤er by the worker and lays the worker o¤, it has to pay TL. Whenever the worker
rejects too low a wage by the rm, the rm has to pay TQ. Since the worker rejects the o¤er, why
dont we consider that TQ = 0? This is done to prevent rms from separating at no cost by simply
cutting the wage down so as to obtain a voluntaryquit. We thus assume that both TL and TQ
are positive. Following a job-to-job movement, the rm does no pay any tax.
Specic human capital costs:
We assume that at match formation, workers incur a xed cost C akin to a specic human
capital investment. This cost is endogenized in the next section, highlighting the complementarity
between human capital acquisition and EPL.
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On-the-job search:
We assume that on-the-job search (OTJS) can only take place after the refusal of an o¤er. If
OTJS is successful, the worker can nd a job without returning to unemployment. The implication
that OTJS takes place around the time of separation with the rm is empirically supported by
works of Nagypál (2006) and Pfann (2001). Nagypál nds that active search on-the-job is a good
predictor not only of job-to-job transitions, but also of becoming unemployed. Pfann nds that
mass layo¤s are preceded by a spike in quits.
3.1 Derivation of equilibrium
All matches start with values "0 and 0 which are known to both sides. Thus upon entry, the wage
w0 is the outcome of Nash bargaining with bargaining powers  and 1   to the worker and the
rm, respectively. After entry, the match is subject to a Poisson process with rate . Upon the
Poisson event, each party receives a new, independent private draw. From that moment and for
the duration of the match, all new idiosyncratic values are private. When the parties receive a new
draw, they renegotiate and with probability  (1 ), the rm (worker) makes a take-it-or-leave-it
o¤er.
Since the new private draws are independent of previous values, all negotiations have the same
ex-ante joint expected payo¤s, which we denote as E(P ). As we have seen above, negotiations may
lead to continuation of the match or to separation. Thus E(P ) incorporates both possibilities. Its
value can be obtained in two di¤erent ways,
E(P ) = E(Prm ) + E(Pworker) = :E(Pf ) + (1  ):E(Pw); (3)
where superscripts represent the side receiving the payo¤s and subscripts represent the side making
the o¤er. The rst part of the equality states that combined payo¤s are the sum of ex-ante payo¤s
to the rm and to the worker, while the second part states that combined payo¤s are a weighted
average of total payo¤s under rm o¤er and total payo¤s under worker o¤er, with the weights
reecting the respective probabilities of making o¤ers.
As is traditional in the literature, we assume the presence of frictions impeding the matching
of workers and rms. This is formalized through a matching function which generates a rate p of
matching for an unemployed worker and a rate q of matching for a vacant rm, both as functions
of market tightness , dened as the ratio of vacant jobs to searching workers (see Pissarides
(2000) for more details). We denote the value of a lled job as J (J0 for entry matches) and the
value of work as W (W0 for entry matches). The value of a vacant job is Jv, while the value of
unemployment is U .
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The value functions are given by
rJ(";w) = h+ "  w + [E(Prm )  J(";w)]  J(";w); (4)
rW (;w) = w +  + [E(Pworker ) W (;w)]  W (;w); (5)
rJ0 = h+ "0   w0 + [E(Prm )  J0]  J0; (6)
rW0 = w0 + 0 + [E(P
worker ) W0]  W0; (7)
rJv =  + q()[J0   Jv] = 0; (8)
rU = z + p()[W0   C   U ]  U; (9)
J0 = (1  )(W0   U): (10)
In ow terms with the future discounted at rate r, the value of a lled job is the sum of productivity
net of wage plus the option value of renegotiating which generates a payo¤ for the rm equal to
E(Prm ) minus the loss associated with an exogenous separation at rate . Such separations are
assumed to be due to workers leaving the labor force altogether. The value of working is the sum
of wage and utility from working plus the option value of renegotiating which generates a payo¤
for the worker equal to E(Pworker) minus the loss associated with an exogenous separation at rate
. The same interpretation can be given for entry matches. The value of a vacant job reects the
payment of a vacancy cost  per period and the option value of meeting an unemployed worker
at rate q(). Free entry drives the value of a vacant job to zero. The value of unemployment is
comprised of an income z while searching plus the option value of nding a rm at rate p() which
generates a value of W0 C, since human capital costs are incurred at the beginning of every new
match. An unemployed worker can also leave the labor force. Finally, the last expression is the
outcome of Nash bargaining at match formation when both productivity and utility are known.
We proceed to derive equilibrium. To fully characterize it, we need to derive job creation and
destruction conditions, as well as to compute the ex-ante payo¤s from the game E(P ). At this
point, it is useful to contrast our equilibrium to the traditional full information MP framework.
In MP, the equilibrium is comprised of only job condition and destruction conditions. This model
di¤ers in two ways from MP. First, the job destruction conditions reect the possibility of ine¢ cient
separations which are ruled out in MP because of Nash bargaining. Second, the manner in which
the surplus is allocated between rm and worker in the negotiations a¤ects separations. This is
not the case in MP because of privately e¢ cient Nash bargaining. Thus ex-ante payo¤s E(P ) are
part of the equilibrium with the bargaining game assumed.
Job destruction:
We have seen in section 2 that the probability of separations Q and L only depend on a quit-
point b" and a layo¤-point b, respectively. We thus need to obtain two destruction conditions. We
can solve the game as in section 2 taking into account that (i) the setup is dynamic, (ii) there exists
separation costs for both sides (EPL and SHC investment), and (iii) upon separation, workers
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have an opportunity to engage in OTJS to avoid returning to unemployment. In particular, we
assume that upon disagreement between worker and rm on the terms of employment, a window of
opportunity opens up for the worker to search for a new rm prior to returning to unemployment.
To keep the setup stationary, we assume that this window of opportunity closes at a Poisson rate
that we take to innity. As this opportunity is very brief, workers devote innite search intensity
units to nding a partner. In the limit, searching with very high intensity over a very short period
results in a probability 
() of successful on-the-job search, which depends on market tightness .
The details of the derivation of 
() are relegated to the Appendix.
The properties of the game in the dynamic framework are the same as in the static one.
Hence, the reservation productivity and utility levels "r(w) and r(w) just make the worker and
rm indi¤erent between accepting or refusing the o¤er and are such that(
J("r) = 
():Jv + (1  
()):(Jv   TL) = Jv   TL;
W (r) = 
():(W0   C) + (1  
()):U = U +
()[W0   C   U ];
where TL = (1   
())TL is the ring tax the rm can expect to pay upon laying the worker o¤.
The two expressions take into account the fact that the refusal of an o¤er may be followed directly
by a job-to-job movement. The second expression takes into account the fact that the worker who
nds a new rm through on-the-job search negotiates with that rm and expects a payo¤W0 C.
Using equations (4)-(5), this leads to the reservation rules(
"r(w) = w   h  E(Prm )  (r + + ):(TL   Jv);
r(w) =  w   E(Pworker ) + (r + + ):(U +
()[W0   C   U ]):
The agentsproblems are to maximize their respective expected surpluses,8<: For the rm, maxw [1 G(r)]:[J("; w) + TQ];For the worker, max
w
[1  F ("r)]:[W (; w)  (U +
()[W0   C   U ])];
where TQ = (1 
())TQ is the ring tax the rm can expect to pay upon having an o¤er refused.
Notice that TQ a¤ects the rms o¤er through the surplus, while TL a¤ects the workers o¤er
through the reservation productivity "r.
The properties of the solution to the game are the same as in the static case. There exist a
quit-point b" and a layo¤-point b which determine the probabilities of separation. These points can
be dened as in section 2 using two ine¢ cient destruction conditions:(
Firm o¤er: Joint value of agreement at (b"; min) = Joint value of disagreement +  1r++ ,
Worker o¤er: Joint value of agreement at ("min; b) = Joint value of disagreement +  1r++ .
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One can rewrite these two conditions as:8
b" = (r + + )(U +
()[W0   C   U ])  TQ)  E(P ) + 2 1   h; (11)b = (r + + )(U +
()[W0   C   U ])  TL)  E(P ) + 2 1   h: (12)
The separation probabilities Q and L following rm and worker o¤ers are determined from the
quit and layo¤ points as
Q =
Z b"
"min
G(b"  "+ min)dF ("); (13)
L =
Z b
min
F (b    + "min)dG(); (14)
Ex-ante payo¤s:
From (3), we can compute the joint ex-ante payo¤s E(P ) by computing the payo¤s conditional
on a particular side o¤er, E(Pf ) and E(Pw). By denition,
E(Pf ) =
Z
continuation
[J(e") +W (e)]dF (e")dG(e) + Z
separation
(U +
()[W0   C   U ])  TQ)dF (e")dG(e);
= (1 Q):Ef [h+ e"+ e + E(P )
r + + 
jcont.] + Q:(U +
()[W0   C   U ])  TQ): (15)
Following a rm o¤er, a separation may occur with probability Q in which case the joint payo¤ is
xed or the two partners may accept to continue with joint payo¤ J +W which depends on the
realization of shocks. Similarly the joint ex-ante payo¤s conditional on a worker o¤er is equal to
E(Pw) = (1  L):Ew[h+ e"+ e + E(P )
r + + 
jcont.] + L:(U +
()[W0   C   U ])  TL): (16)
Job creation:
Equations (6)-(7) can be used to obtain an expression for the total surplus at match formation,
which combined with free entry of rms (8) give us that

q
= (1  )[h+ "0 + 0 + E(P )
r + + 
  U ]: (17)
We can use equations (9) and (10) to obtain
U =
z pC+ 1 
r+ ;
W0   U = 1  q :
Denition: An equilibrium is comprised of a quit-point b", a layo¤-point b, a market tightness 
and joint ex-ante payo¤s from negotiating E(P ) satisfying two job destruction conditions (11)-(12),
a job creation condition (17) and ex-ante payo¤s given by (3), and (15)-(16).
8Calculations can be provided upon request by the authors.
13
3.2 Equilibrium stocks and ows
One can compute the unemployment rate as well as the durations of employment, unemployment
and job tenure. For an employed worker, there are four possible transitions: (i) layo¤ to unem-
ployment, (ii) quit to unemployment, (iii) direct transition to another job and (iv) transition out
of the labor force. All these transitions are determined in equilibrium:2666666664
Layo¤ rate: L = :(1  ):L:(1  
);
Quit rate: Q = ::Q:(1  
);
Job-to-job rate: JJ = :(Q+ (1  )L):
;
OLF rate: OLF = ;
Separation rate: S = :(Q+ (1  )L):
A layo¤ takes place when a -shock hits, the worker gets to make the o¤er (probability ), the
o¤er is not accepted (probability L) and the worker is not able to nd a job before returning to
unemployment (probability 1 
). A quit takes place when a -shock hits, the rm gets to make
the o¤er (probability 1 ), the o¤er is not accepted (probability Q) and the worker is not able to
nd a job before returning to unemployment. There is a job-to-job transition when an unsuccessful
o¤er is followed directly by a new job (probability 
). We also include transitions out of the labor
force which are assumed exogenous, at rate . Finally, we dene a separation rate which is the rate
at which matches end up terminating due to unsuccessful negotiations, regardless of the workers
next destination (unemployment or another job). This allows to distinguish between job tenure
and employment durations, which are two di¤erent concepts with OTJS.
To compute durations and tenure, it is useful to refer to the ow graph in Appendix. The
average unemployment duration is the inverse of the sum of all rates inducing a movement out
unemployment. A similar denition applies to average employment duration. Finally, job tenure
di¤ers from the latter, since movements out of a current job are more frequent than movements
out of employment. Thus,264 Average unemployment duration:
1
+p ;
Average employment duration: 1+S(1 
) ;
Average job tenure: 1+S :
Finally, we compute the unemployment rate in Appendix and nd that
u% =
 + S(1  
)
 + S(1  
) + p
:
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4 Acquisition of specic human capital
4.1 Optimal investment in specic skills
Specic human capital is an implicit separation cost incurred by workers, because they have to
repay it upon starting a new job. So, it acts as the dual of conventional separation costs paid by
rms. We now model such a human capital investment. Prior to the negotiation, workers invest
in skills at a sunk cost C(h   h0) with C 0 > 0 and C 00 > 0. We assume that workers start with
human capital h0, hence C(0) = 0. The optimal investment in skills is such that
C 0(h  h0) = dW0
dh
where W0 is the entry value of unemployment. Skills are purely specic so that @U=@h = 0 as
formalized in Wasmer (2006), so that the rst order condition can be rewritten as
C 0(h  h0) = dW0
dh
= 
1 + dE(P )=dh
r + + 
: (18)
Denote by h the optimal level of e¤ort. Adding an investment decision only adds condition (18)
to equilibrium. For all other conditions, the cost C is replaced by C(h   h0) where h satises
(18).
4.2 The complementarity between layo¤cost and specic human capital
investments
We are now better able to understand the role of employment protection on ows in the labor
market. We want to illustrate the complementarity between EPL and SHC. We do so analytically
in a simpler case where TL = TQ = T and  =  and where on-the-job search is shut down. The
numerical work in section 5 generalizes the result.
We rst take the equilibrium conditions and look at partial equilibrium by taking market tight-
ness  and investment costs C as xed. Di¤erentiating the system, we obtain that separations are
negatively a¤ected both by an increase in layo¤ costs T and by an increase in h. The di¤erentiation
detailed in Appendix yields the following relation:
dQ =  B(rdT + dh); (19)
where B 1 =  1b"f 0(b") +  1r+ (2  f(b")b"f 0(b") ) > 0.
We can now quantify the multiplier e¤ect of human capital by di¤erentiating equation (18),
governing optimal skill investment. Human capital investment declines with a higher quit rate, as
the expected duration of employment goes down, the marginal return on specic skills declines, a
mechanism discussed in Wasmer (2006). Formally,
dh =  AdQ; (20)
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where A = B 2 r+
1
b" 1C00(h h0) > 0. We can now combine equations (19)-(20)to obtain
dQ =   B
1 ABrdT:
In the absence of variations in h, a unit increase in rT leads to a reduction in turnover of B
units. This e¤ect is augmented by (1 AB) 1 > 1 when specic skills react to the increase in T .
The intuition is easy to grasp: a higher T reduces turnover and raises h as indicated by equation
(20). This is all the more important that A is large, i.e. when h is more elastic to Q (notably
when investment costs are not too convex). Instead, an inelastic h, reected by convex costs and
hence low A, does not amplify the partial equilibrium response of Q to the ring tax.
5 Quantitative analysis
5.1 Labor market transitions
We rst want to obtain summary statistics of labor market transitions, focusing on a sample of the
25-54 year old population for the period 1994-2001. The U.S. ows are reported from Garibaldi
and Wasmer (2005). The ows for European countries are based on authorscalculation from the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). We consider that workers can be in one of three
states: employed, unemployed or out of the labor force and look at the data in two di¤erent ways
in order to guide our calibration. First, we quantify the rate at which workers ow between these
three states. Thus we reproduce average durations in any state. Second, the theoretical model
makes a clear distinction between layo¤s to unemployment, quits into unemployment and job-to-
job transitions. So conditional on a separation from a rm, we classify the transitions according
to the category in which it falls. Thus, we also precisely match the di¤erent types of separation
from the rm.
We report the six transitions between states e, u and n (employment, unemployment and
inactivity) where xy, x; y 2 fe; u; ng represents the monthly transition rate between states x and
y. The average duration in state x is thus 1=(xy + xz) where y and z are two distinct states from
x. Such numbers are reported in table 1. We average out the Continental European countries
(Germany, France, Spain and Italy) in the 5th column, while column 6 reports U.K. statistics and
the last column reports U.S. statistics (note that the latter comes from another source).
Insert table 1 here [transitions between states].
The second set of statistics is obtained for the countries in the ECHP dataset only. We know,
for all persons in the survey at time t who left a previous job within two years, the reason for having
left that job.9 This information is available regardless of current status (employed, unemployed
9The exact universe is the 25-54 population having been previously employed and, according to the survey
documentation, person stopped working in last job at the earliest 2 years before it joined the survey.
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or inactive). The survey allowed for twelve possible reasons for leaving a job. In table 2, we
show how we grouped the survey answers either by type of decision - layo¤s, quits, job-to-job
transitions or family/demographic transitions, or by destination - unemployment, out of the labor
force or directly to another job. In family/demographic transitions, we regroup family and personal
reasons such as health reasons, unrelated to the current job. This will correspond to the exogenous
-transitions out of the labor force in the theoretical model. We report in table 3 the data for the
di¤erent European countries.10
Insert table 2 here [dening the di¤erent types of separation from rm].
Insert table 3 here [reporting that data].
5.2 Numerical strategy and calibration
The methodology is to consider separately an economy where there is no possibility to invest
in specic human capital (exogenous human capital) and another economy where workers can
invest in human capital at the beginning of a match (endogenous human capital). In both
cases, we calibrate on the U.S. economy to determine the structural parameters (using U.S. policy
parameters) and then experiment with that same economy only changing policy parameters to
reect European type regulations. We are mostly interested in three types of predictions: (i) ows
between the labor market states, (ii) the degree of investment in human capital, and (iii) losses
associated with separation from a rm. Proceeding as we do enables us: to evaluate how much
of the di¤erence in ows between the U.S. and Europe are due to ring restrictions; to determine
how much more can be explained when incentives to specialize (i.e. invest in human capital) are
enhanced by such restrictions; to quantify the investment in human capital; and to determine
losses from separations with and without specialization.
We rst calibrate a US economy with no ring costs in a world where human capital investment
is not allowed and refer to it as the exogenous HC case. We take the human capital investment
cost function to be quadratic, i.e. C(h   h0) = c0:(h   h0)2=2. In the exogenous case, we set
c0 = 0 and h0 = 1 as a normalization. The time period is 1 month. The discount rate is chosen
so that the annual interest rate is 4%. Frictions in this model come from shocks that lead to
renegotiations and to informational frictions which impede on the matching of workers with rms.
We assume as is traditional in the matching literature that the arrival rate  corresponds to shocks
hitting a match approximately every other year on average.11 The di¢ culty in nding partners
for unemployed workers and vacant rms is modeled through a Cobb-Douglas meeting function
and the elasticity of meeting with respect to vacancies is  = 0:5 as estimated by Petrongolo and
10We do not have strictly comparable data for the U.S. Consequently, we retain the same proportion of layo¤s,
quits, family/demographic and job-to-job transitions conditional on separation from the rm, as estimated for the
U.K. Nonetheless, as we have that data, we calibrate the US economy to match US unemployment and employment
durations.
11We actually choose  = 1=20 to help with replicating a relatively low employment duration.
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Pissarides (2001). Finally, we choose the initial shocks "0 = 0 = 0 equal to the mean of the
distributions of private values. The policy parameters, unemployment insurance z and the ring
costs TQ and TL, are determined by U.S. regulations, z = 0:25 and TQ = TL = 0.
We close out the calibration by matching labor market transitions and the di¤erent types of
separations from a current job. Thus we choose parameters to replicate an average duration of
employment of 3:2 years and an average duration of unemployment of 2:4 months. Notice that due
to the possibility to carry out on-the-job search, the theoretical model makes a distinction between
employment duration and job tenure, as opposed to the traditional Mortensen and Pissarides
framework. However, since we use transition data out of the various labor market states, we
match employment duration. We also match a ratio of layo¤s to total separations of 22:5%, quits
to separations of 11:1%, family/demographic transitions to total separations of 27:1% and job-
to-job movements to total separations of 39:3%. Finally, model parameters were set to obtain a
market tightness equal to 1 and average vacancy posting costs of 4 months. The calibrated values
are reproduced in table 4.
Insert table 4 here [U.S. exogenous calibration].
Next, we recalibrate a US economy now allowing for investment in human capital and refer to
it as the endogenous HC case. We proceed in essentially the same manner, but for the fact that
we have to calibrate two new parameters, the cost parameter c0 and the increment in productivity
h  h0. We set the pre-investment productivity h0 = 0:75 to be in line with earnings losses from
separation of 25% as in Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and calibrate c0 so that total
investment is again equal to h = 1. All the other parameters have to also be recalibrated. The
calibrated values are reproduced in table 5.
Insert table 5 here [U.S. endogenous calibration].
5.3 Simulations
Labor market ows:
Let us rst look at the e¤ect of ring costs on labor market ows in the exogenous case. We take
the US structural parameters and choose for Europe a value of z = 2=3. We choose T = TQ = TL
throughout and let T vary from 0 to 9 months of output. The results are consistent with what
has been previously found both in the empirical and theoretical literatures. Employment and
unemployment durations increase (combining to cause a small decrease of the unemployment rate
in that case.) We also nd that the quit rate, the layo¤ rate and the job-to-job transition rates
decrease. Thus all types of ows are also reduced by employment protection legislation.12 The
results of our simulations in the exogenous case are reported in table 6.
12Notice that the ratio of the quit to layo¤ rates decreases with T , yet not su¢ ciently to match the ratios observed
in Europe [see our data from ECHP or Blanchard and Portugal (2001)].
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Insert gure 2 and table 6 here [T and ows, exogenous case].
While qualitatively the model performs well by indeed reducing all types of ows out of jobs
as well as ows into jobs, it does not perform as well quantitatively. The levels of employment and
unemployment durations are too low (3:5 years and 4 months respectively) and these durations are
too insensitive to rather large changes in employment protection legislation (employment duration
only increases by a year and unemployment duration increases by less than a month when ring
costs are increased to 9 months of output). Notice that by proceeding the way we did, changing
z while keeping the other structural parameters unchanged, we necessarily started with a lower
employment duration than that calibrated for the U.S. This is because increasing z reduces the
gap between the value of unemployment and that of employment and leads to more separations.
So, this explains in part why predicted European employment durations are too low. However,
that does not provide a rationale for the lack of variability of employment duration with respect
to T . It is however conceivable that looking at the endogenous case, we may nd more variability
due to the multiplier e¤ect coming from the interactions of ring costs with the incentive to invest
in specic human capital. This is what we do next.
When we consider the endogenous case (table 7), we can see that all ows out of jobs are reduced
regardless of their type, as evidenced by increasing employment durations and reduced quit, layo¤
and job-to-job rates as with the exogenous case. However, we also observe a slight decrease in
unemployment duration. This is due to the fact that with higher human capital investment,
matches are more protable and rms post more vacancies. In equilibrium, this tends to keep
employment duration lower. As a result, the multiplierwe nd by comparing the exogenous and
endogenous cases is relatively weak: by increasing T from 0 to 9 months of output, employment
duration increases by approximately 30% in the exogenous case, and by approximately 35% in
the endogenous case. In a way, our success in nding that employment protection legislation does
enhance the incentive to invest in human capital comes at the cost of a lower multiplier.
It is worth commenting on that lack of a really strong multiplier e¤ect. First, we tried di¤erent
parametric specications and assumptions on the nature of the distribution of private values F
and G and although one can nd higher values for the multiplier, these values are still too low
to help match European employment durations. The issue is always that more human capital
investment tends to reduce unemployment duration and thus puts downward pressure on durations
as well in equilibrium. To better understand this issue, it is worth taking a look at the di¤erent
e¤ects at play. With no investment in human capital, we have the usual e¤ect that increasing T
makes it more costly to separate and reduces matches surplus, thus causing job creation and job
destruction to fall. In this model however, there is also another mechanism at play even without
HC investment. Since we may have ine¢ cient destructions, increasing separation costs would
cause employment duration to increase and unemployment duration to decrease because of fewer
ine¢ cient destructions of surplus.
When we let workers choose their specic HC, we add two new e¤ects. First, specialized work-
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ers are more productive, increasing surplus and reducing unemployment duration. Second, since
re-investment represents a cost to workers in case of separation, it reduces their value of unem-
ployment and thus their bargaining position, further encouraging vacancy posting and reducing
unemployment duration.
Thus, if we compare this model to the traditional Mortensen and Pissarides framework, we
add three e¤ects that each tend to reduce unemployment duration. More employment protection
legislation reduces ine¢ cient surplus destructions, it encourages worker to increase their produc-
tivity and it adversely a¤ect their bargaining position. We leave it for future research to determine
which e¤ect is the most important quantitatively.
In conclusion, the endogenous model delivers the right qualitative predictions on ows out of
jobs, but due to the fact that more productive workers implies a shorter duration of unemployment,
the multiplier e¤ect is relatively weak. As we have seen, this model introduces new mechanisms
that tend to keep unemployment duration low. To remedy that, there are a few avenues to consider.
First, one could put investment costs either on the rm side or have them shared between the two
parties. This would reverse one of the new e¤ects highlighted. Second, one could consider that
longer unemployment durations in Europe are due more to the fact that more jobs are refused
before nally leaving unemployment, rather than because of large di¤erences in market tightness
between the U.S. and Europe. This would be akin to adding an acceptance margin for jobs.
As opposed to the traditional Mortensen and Pissarides model, this can be done easily within
this framework, by considering that the same asymmetric bargaining applies for all, new and
continuing, jobs. This way we avoid the fact that with Nash bargaining for entry jobs, all rst
o¤ers are necessarily accepted.
Insert table 7 here [T and ows, endogenous case].
Incentive to specialize and losses from displacement:
We can verify that employment protection legislation provides an incentive to specialize by
looking at how human capital investment varies with T . Table 8 shows that as employment
protection legislation increases from 0 to 9 months of output, additional specic investment has
made the worker 7% more productive. Even though nothing in the calibration was chosen from
that perspective, it is of the same order of magnitude as the gures reported in Layard and Nickell
(1999) who nd that based on six continental European countries (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) in 1994, productivity measured as GDP per hour worked was
4% higher in continental European countries than in the U.S.
Can the specialization of European workers also account for the resistance to mass layo¤s
as alluded to in the introduction? We tackle that question by looking as lifetime losses from
displacement and measure it as the loss in value for employed workers net of their unemployment
value, E[W jmatch]  U . We also compute this loss relative to U , i.e. (E[W jmatch]  U)=U . We
nd that as T varies from 0 to 9 months of output, the relative losses due to displacement increase
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from 3:56% when T = 0 to 6:57% when T = 9. Thus specialization is consistent with larger losses
as it increases the gap between current employment at high productivity and unemployment with
re-investment costs. This is even despite the fact that unemployment insurance is higher in Europe
and that market tightness increases with T in the simulations for the endogenous case. We can also
compare the same relative lifetime losses for a European worker (with T = 9) and an American
worker (with T = 0 and lower UI benets). We nd that while the loss is 6:57% for the European
worker, it is only 5:28% for the American worker. The model predicts that there is more resistance
to layo¤s in Europe because European workers have relatively more to lose in lifetime value from
displacement.
Insert table 8 here [T and HC investment].
6 Conclusion
We developed a matching model characterized by all types of labor market transitions and featuring
separation costs both on the rm and the worker sides to study how ring restrictions a¤ect
European labor markets. When workers can invest in specic human capital, ring restrictions
induces specialization which makes separation more costly. Quantitatively, our model showed that
indeed workers who are protected by more stringent regulations invest more in specic capital
and as a result have more to lose from separation. This is consistent with European experience
where employed workers are more productive and yet oppose layo¤s more. A model lacking the
investment motive would not deliver these combined predictions.
Our model also nds that ring restrictions reduce all the di¤erent types of separations from
the rm (layo¤s, quits into unemployment and job-to-job transitions), consistent with less mobility
in European labor markets. The complementarity that exists between job stability and human
capital investment is however quantitatively determined to be relatively weak. We found it to
be because our model introduces three new channels through which EPL a¤ects unemployment
duration - ine¢ cient separations are fewer, more productive workers induce more vacancy posting,
and re-investment costs in the next job adversely a¤ect the worker bargaining position in the
current job. We suggested several ways to undo these e¤ects.
One interpretation of our model is that EPL may be central to understand the restricted
ows out of jobs and from jobs to jobs, as well as the incentive to specialize and the associated
resistance to layo¤s, but that unemployment insurance may be central in understanding ows out
of unemployment. In future research, we intend to adjust this framework to add a job acceptance
margin at entry. This can be done relatively easily within this setup by letting all negotiations be
determined by the same asymmetric information bargaining game.
Another alley of research is to empirically assess the importance of specic capital investment
in Europe versus the U.S., a task made di¢ cult rst by the lack of available direct evidence across
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countries, and second by the fact that wage compression in Europe may interfere with inferences
one can make from evidence on earning losses.
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Appendix
A Optimal wage o¤ers
A.1 Proof of uniqueness of o¤er
The interior solution is conveniently rewritten as a function of r(wf ). In using f = r(wf )    +
("; ) where by linearity,   + ("; ) is independent of  (unknown to the rm anyway), we have
HG(r(wf ))
 1 = r(wf )    + ("; ). The right hand side is linear in r(wf ) and the left hand side is
decreasing or constant, so that there is at most one intersection r(wf ) and thus one wage. Further, since
 increases in ", the intersection r(wf ) decreases in " and the wage wf increases in ".
A.2 Surpluses in the static case
When the rm makes the o¤er, it is also informative to compute the surpluses to the rm f and to the
worker w: 8><>:
rm surplus =

 1; if " < b";
 1 + "  b"; if "  b";
worker surplus =

   min + "  b"; if " < b";
   min; if "  b":
In other terms, when the rm makes an o¤er, it obtains for itself at least a surplus equal to  1, conditional
on reaching an agreement. When the solution is a corner, then acceptance of the o¤er by the worker is
guaranteed and  1 becomes a lower bound for the rm surplus. Clearly, the rm is not going to make an
o¤er that would not at least match its outside option and there cannot be a layo¤ following a rm o¤er.
A quit occurs when the workers surplus is negative. When the solution is interior, the worker may
quit when the total surplus is less than  1. Separations that take place when the total surplus is between
0 and  1 are thus ine¢ cient, a natural feature with asymmetric information and take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers.
A similar formula can be given for the surplus of each party when the worker makes the o¤er:8><>:
rm surplus =

"  "min +    b; if  < b;
"  "min; if   b;
worker surplus =

 1; if  < b;
 1 +    b; if   b:
B Dynamic case
B.1 Calculation of the probability 
() of job-to-job movement
We represent all the possible movements of workers in the following graph.
Insert gure 3 here [ow chart].
In steady state, 8><>:
L = Un + Es + E s;
L+ Es = ( + p())Un;
p()Un + pe()Es = (S + )E s;
SE s = ( + pe() + )Es;
where L is the size of the labor force, Un the number of unemployed workers, Es the number of employed
workers searching on-the-job, E s the number of employed workers not searching. Denote by  the rate
at which the option to search on-the-job before having to return to unemployment terminates. The rate
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at which on-the-job searchers do nd a new rm is pe(). As ! +1 (the OTJS window just opens up
for an instant), it must be that pe ! +1 as well. Denote 	 = lim=pe that we assume nite. We are
looking for 
() the fraction of workers who just got a bad-shock and who instantaneouslyfound a
new job. By denition,

() =
pe()Es
SE s
=
pe()
 + pe() + 
=
1
1 + 	
;
in the limit.
The number of meetings is given by m(suUn+seEs; V ), where su, se are the respective search intensity
units. Thus the individual meeting probabilities are given by si
suUn+seEs
m(suUn+seEs; V ), i = u; e. Dene
market tightness  = V
suUn+seEs
. Then, 
p() = su:m(1; );
pe() = se:m(1; ):
That implies that se ! +1. Dene 	0 = lim=se. Thus 	0 = 	:m(1; ). Let us normalize su = 1.
Consequently, 	0 = 	:p() and

() =
1
1 + 	0:p() 1
=
p()
p() + 	0
:
We can use 	0 as a search intensity parameter for the employed to help us match job-to-job ows.
B.2 Calculation of the unemployment rate
We can rewrite the system of ow equations taking into account that  ! +1 and pe ! +1. Also
remember that =pe ! 	 = 	0:p() 1. Since L + Es = ( + p())Un, it must be that Es ! 0 and
E s ! E (total employment). Thus, the above system of ow equations can be rewritten as8><>:
L = Un + E;
L+ (Es) = ( + p())Un;
p()Un +	
 1(Es) = (S + )E;
SE = (1 + 	
 1)(Es):
This is a system in Un, E and (Es) to solve. Using the fact that 
() = 1=(1+	), one can compute the
unemployment rate u% = Un=L as
u% =
 + (1  
())S
 + (1  
())S + p()
:
B.3 Multiplier e¤ects of specic skills
We have, di¤erentiating the equations for Q, b" E(P ) that
dQ =  b"f 0(b")db";
db" =  (r + )dT   dE(P )  dh;
(r + )(dE(P ) + dT ) =  2 1dQ   1f(b")db":
So, eliminating rst db" and then dE(P ) from these equations, we obtain
  dQb"f 0(b") =  (r + )dT   dE(P )  dh;
(r + )(dE(P ) + dT ) =   1dQ

2  f(b")b"f 0(b")

;
thus dQ =  rdT dh
  1b"f0(b")+ r+ 1

2  f(b")b"f0(b")
 =  B(rdT + dh):
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The rst equation states that a higher ring tax or a higher turnover rate reduce the expected payo¤.
The second equation determines the impact of layo¤ costs and specic human capital on turnover: both
reduce turnover; further, a marginal unit of specic skills dh has the same impact as the interest payment
of a unit of ring tax rdT .
We also have, di¤erentiating the equation for E(P ) that
dE(P )
dh
= @E(P )
@Q
@Q
@h
= 1
r+

+2 1 +  1 f(b") b"f 0(b")

( @Q=@h) ;
= 1
r+

+2 1 +  1 f(b") b"f 0(b")

B:
Thus after di¤erentiation,
C00(h  h0)dh = r+d

dE(P)
dh

= d
db"

+2 1 +  1 f(b") b"f 0(b")

B

db";
= 
r+
d
db"

+2 1 +  1 f(b") b"f 0(b")

B

dQ
 b"f 0(b") ;
= 
r+
1
 b"f 0(b") ddb"

2 1 +  1 f(b") b"f 0(b")

B

dQ;
using the fact that f 0(")=f(") = f 00(")=f 0(") =   and showing that a higher turnover rate discourages
specic investments. Then dening
A = B 2

r + 
+(b") 2 + 1b" (1 + b"f 00(b")=f 0(b"))+2 1    1 f(b")b"f 0(b")
C00(h  h0) ;
we obtain the relationship in Section 4.2.
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Figure 1: Static negotiating game
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Figure 2: Transitions out of jobs
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Figure 3: Flow chart
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Table 1:
Summary statistics, transitions
country Germany France Italy Spain
Cont.
Europe
U.K. U.S.
monthly ows (%)
eu 0.507 0.613 0.462 1.572 0.789 0.366 1.02
en 0.188 0.182 0.186 0.220 0.194 0.355 1.62
ue 5.773 6.983 3.090 6.082 5.482 6.590 25.90
un 0.943 1.769 0.142 0.295 0.787 1.970 16.59
ne 1.038 1.280 0.297 0.458 0.768 1.449 3.46
nu 0.287 0.953 0.102 0.181 0.381 0.503 4.43
duration E (yrs) 12.0 10.5 12.9 4.7 9.9 11.5 3.2
duration U (mths) 14.9 11.4 30.9 15.7 18.2 11.7 2.4
duration N (yrs) 6.3 3.7 20.9 13.0 11.0 4.3 1.1
Ergodic stock/population
Unemployment 7.77 7.95 13.75 20.62 12.52 5.38 5.50
29
Table 2:
Reason for leaving previous job
among total population 25-54 y.o.
Grouped
by decision
Grouped
by destination
obliged to stop by employer Layo¤ Unemployment
end contract / temporary job Layo¤ Unemployment
sale / closure of own family business Layo¤ Unemployment
marriage Family/demographic Out of labor force
child birth / look after children Family/demographic Out of labor force
looking after old, sick, disabled persons Family/demographic Out of labor force
partners job required move to another place Family/demographic Out of labor force
study / national service Family/demographic Out of labor force
own illness or disability Family/demographic Out of labor force
wanted to retire or leave o¤ private means Family/demographic Out of labor force
obtained better job Job-to-job Employment
other Quit Unemployment
Table 3:
Reason for leaving the previous job
Country France Germany Italy Spain
Continental
Europe
U.K./U.S.
Layo¤ 49.1% 39.9% 41.5% 58.3% 47.1% 22.5%
Family/demographic 20.1% 40.4% 24.9% 16.1% 25.4% 27.1%
Quit 4.8% 10.1% 2.9% 4.9% 5.7% 11.1%
Job-to-job 26.0% 9.6% 30.7% 20.7% 21.8% 39.3%
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Table 4: Table 5:
U.S. exogenous calibration:
Normalization:
deterministic productivity h 1
Rates:
discount rate r 0:0033
exogenous family transitions  0:0118
Shock process:
arrival rate  0:05
parameter of F -distribution,  2:66
parameter of G-distribution,  3:46
Negotiating parameters:
initial bargaining power workers  0:29
rms o¤er probability  0:36
Entry matches:
initial rm productivity "0 0
initial worker utility 0 0
Matching frictions:
matching function scale parameter A 0:40
elasticity matching function  0:5
vacancy posting costs  1:62
OTJS e¢ ciency parameter 	0 0:34
Policy parameters:
U.I. replacement rate z 0:25
ring costs, layo¤ TL 0
ring costs, quit TQ 0
U.S. endogenous calibration:
Normalization:
deterministic productivities h0; h 0:75; 1
Rates:
discount rate r 0:0033
exogenous family transitions  0:0118
Shock process:
arrival rate  0:05
parameter of F -distribution,  2:51
parameter of G-distribution,  2:03
Negotiating parameters:
initial bargaining power workers  0:40
rms o¤er probability  0:32
Entry matches:
initial rm productivity "0 0
initial worker utility 0 0
Matching frictions:
matching function scale parameter A 0:40
elasticity matching function  0:5
vacancy posting costs  1:62
OTJS e¢ ciency parameter 	0 0:34
Policy parameters:
U.I. replacement rate z 0:25
ring costs, layo¤ TL 0
ring costs, quit TQ 0
HC investment:
cost parameter c0 34:87
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Table 6:
T (months) - exogenous case 0 3 6 9
Employment duration (years) 2:7y 2:8y 3:1y 3:5y
Unemployment duration (months) 3:5m 3:7m 3:8m 3:9m
Unemployment rate (%) 10:2% 10:2% 9:8% 9:0%
Monthly quit rate 0:0065 0:0059 0:0049 0:0038
Monthly layo¤ rate 0:0127 0:0117 0:0103 0:0085
Monthly JJ rate 0:0153 0:0133 0:0111 0:0087
Table 7:
T (months) - endogenous case 0 3 6 9
Employment duration (years) 2:8y 3:0y 3:2y 3:7y
Unemployment duration (months) 3:2m 3:2m 3:1m 3:0m
Unemployment rate (%) 9:1% 8:7% 7:8% 6:5%
Monthly quit rate 0:0060 0:0055 0:0048 0:0039
Monthly layo¤ rate 0:0121 0:0109 0:0093 0:0072
Monthly JJ rate 0:0156 0:0142 0:0126 0:0108
Table 8:
T (months) - endogenous case 0 3 6 9
htotal (normalized) 1 +1:63% +3:97% +7:62%
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